

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
INFORMATION REPORT

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SOURCE:

The following paragraphs present the reasons for holding an early November 1954 Communist Party of India Central Committee session and summarize the activities of the session as described in the attachments listed below, which are available in the CIA Library.

1. An emergency session of the Central Committee (CC) of the Communist Party of India (CPI) was held in New Delhi, 3-7 November 1954, in order to consider a proposed resolution of the Politburo (PB) rejecting the theses contained in an article by R. Palme Dutt, "New Features in the National Liberation Struggle of Colonial and Dependent Peoples," which appeared in the 8 October 1954 issue of For a Lasting Peace, For a People's Democracy.
2. Rejection of the theses of R. P. Dutt was telegraphically communicated to all Central Committee members by the PB and each was asked to attend the CC meeting without fail. The PB wanted immediate approval of its proposed resolution.

In the meantime the PB got a telegram from Ajoy Ghosh, General Secretary of the CPI, then in Moscow. He asked the PB not to be hasty and suggested postponement of the CC meeting until he returned to India, since there was no urgent reason for settling the problem. This was not acceptable to the PB.

3. It was brought out at the CC meeting that only five members of the PB were present when the proposed resolution against Dutt's article was approved by the PB. Proponents of this resolution were Rajeshwar Rao, P. Sundarayya, S. A. Dange,

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E. M. S. Namboodripad, and Basava Punayya. The drafters of the resolution were Dange, Namboodripad, and Sundarayya. Consideration of the draft was the first business, a draft which can be summed up as follows: Fear is expressed that the United States is supposed to be the main enemy and that the fight against the British and also the Nehru Government will be given up. Therefore, in order to continue the fight, we should not accept the line set down by Dutt.

4. The next item of business was placing a second draft resolution before the CC. This resolution was drafted by Romesh Chandra and S. G. Sardesai and was supported by Dr. Ahmed, S. G. Sardesai, Dr. Adhikari, S. S. Mirajkar, Sudan Deshmukh, L. R. Khandkar, Romesh Chandra, H. K. Vyas, Y. D. Sharma, Ranen Sen and the Bengal, Bihar, Assam, and Orissa delegates. The essence of this second draft resolution was:
 - a. R. P. Dutt has contributed to the Party program.
 - b. There is no contradiction with the policy of the Third Party Congress held in Madura. Dutt exhibits a deep understanding of that line.
 - c. He has correctly pointed out the real danger. We have underestimated the danger of the U. S. in its economic and political attacks and methods. We have not learned our lesson from the manner in which the United States attacked Pakistan and now has control of it. The same applies to Israel.
 - d. On the other hand Dutt has correctly pointed out that the British are also trying to maintain their supremacy over colonial and dependent countries. Their policy of freedom to colonial peoples is bogus, as can be seen from their handling of Malaya and Africa. Therefore, Dutt has correctly exposed British imperialism, intrigues, conspiracies and repressive methods for the maintenance of colonies by force in those cases where it was not possible to compromise with the upper classes to maintain their sovereignty and economic domination. Therefore, the tendency of overestimating the United States strength is checked. The British are also fighting with the United States to maintain supremacy, which Dutt has clearly stated.
 - e. There is confusion as to who the main enemy is--Great Britain or the United States. To assume that only Great Britain is our enemy is wrong, and also to assume that only the United States is our enemy is wrong. Dutt has pointed out that both are our enemies and that both should be fought for freedom and independence.
 - f. He has correctly pointed out that the struggles against the British and the U.S. are not two isolated struggles because the objectives of the U.S. are not limited to war. The U.S. also wants political and economic domination and, therefore, the struggle against the U.S. is not only a struggle for freedom but also a struggle for peace. Consequently the struggle for freedom and independence is mainly against the British, but it is also against the U.S.
 - g. Dutt also pointed out that the struggle against the U.S. is also developing in Britain, although in a very primitive form. The British people have begun to think that the U.S. is attempting to make Britain a colony and that they are dominating the British. This growing feeling against the U.S. in Britain can be utilized because there is a common principle involved in a common cause.
 - h. Dutt's policy, democratic unity, is not different from the Madura resolution. Unity with the member of the Congress Party is correctly maintained and is consistent with the line established at Madura.

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1. Dutt's understanding of an interim government prior to a Peoples' Democratic government is also correct but he has not stated what form this will take, the reason being that his article was not written only for India.
5. The PB observed that their resolution was about to be defeated and threatened to resign if a vote were taken. Some PB members insisted that a vote should be taken. Consequently, there was a vote on the question of whether or not a vote should be taken on the above two resolutions. The result of this was twelve in favor of voting and twenty against. Dr. Ahmed was the principal opponent of the PB resolution from within the PB. P. Ramamurthi first supported the PB resolution, but later opposed it. Nearly all CC members were present at this meeting and all voiced their opinions, except S. A. Dange.
6. At the suggestion of Sardar Sohensingh Josh, a sub-committee composed of the following individuals was appointed: E. M. S. Namboodripad, P. Ramamurthi, Z. A. Ahmed, Surjit Singh Josh, Basava Punnnaya, Jyoti Bose and S. G. Sardesai. This group was asked to prepare a report on the national and international situation as it had developed since the last Party Congress. On the basis of this report the discussion would be reopened and a final decision reached.
7. P. Sundarayya and Rajeshwar Rao refused to serve on the sub-committee and are totally opposed to Dutt's line. They even threatened resignation from the CC if it were adopted. It was felt by the CC, however, that their point of view should be represented on the sub-committee and Basava Punnnaya, who supports it, was placed on the sub-committee to give it voice. The Dutt line is meeting much opposition. Some Indian Communists say that the Communist Party of the Soviet Union can err and point to the changing line on Tito. If wrong on Tito, they say, errors can be made concerning India.
8. The sub-committee was to meet in Delhi for about a week, commencing 10 or 11 December 1955, in order to prepare the draft of a political thesis to be presented to the CC meeting tentatively scheduled for 10 January 1955.
9. The impressions of certain CCM's and some other Communists, who know the details of the CC meeting, are:
 - a. The leadership of the CPI will not improve.
 - b. A new crisis is rapidly developing within the Party.
 - c. Internationalism has again undermined the PB and the Party leadership. Basava Punnnaya, for example, said in the CC meeting that the Party should only consider guidance received from the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Chinese Communist Party, and should not be concerned with other Communist Parties. In the meantime General Secretary Ajoy Ghosh may return from Moscow with instructions.

Attachments: Available in CIA Library:

- A: Draft Resolution for the Emergency Session of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of India, 20 October 1954. (4 pages)

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B: Copy of a report (5 pages) of an eye witness of the sessions of the CC and the CPI, 3-7 November 1954.

C: Copy of a report (15 pages) of an eye witness of the sessions of the CC of the CPI, 3-7 November 1954.

Distribution of Attachments:

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